Indian Military

For most nations, nuclear proliferation is a subject which is viewed selectively. They turn a blind eye to it if it suits them or they enlarge the crime of proliferation beyond all scope if it is against their interests. After the signing of the discriminatory NPT in 1967, the stage was set for a clearly demarcated world of ‘Nuclear-Haves’ and “Nuclear-Have-nots”.

India upset the apple-cart, and the established nuclear world order, with the conduct of its nuclear tests in May 1998. Pakistan followed suit just a fortnight thereafter. It took a decade for the world to realize the changing equations of nuclear power and bring India back from nuclear isolation and accept it as a responsible nuclear state. Yet nuclear proliferation had continued unhindered in many parts of the worlds, largely thanks to the efforts of Dr A Q Khan’s nefarious network. Pakistan exported nuclear material and know-how to North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria and received more of the same through the good offices of China. The West had turned a blind eye to this. It was only when the fruits of the proliferation stared them in the face via North Korea, Iran and even Myanmar, that nuclear proliferation once again became a major policy issue which called for a revision of the existing nuclear world order. North Korea literally called the shots by the conduct of its first nuclear test in Oct 06 which confirmed their nuclear capabilities. The test provoked International condemnation and sanctions but did not curb its belligerence. Rather they followed up by firing long range rockets, like the Taepodong 2; a nuclear-capable missile which though crude, could reach targets as far as Alaska. Analysts believe that it is had produced enough enriched Plutonium for 4-5 bombs and now embarked on a Uranium based route to the bomb. On 25 May 2009, North Korea shook the world community again when it tested a 20-kiloton Uranium-based device; a powerful detonation measuring 4.5 on the Richter scale. They followed that act by test-firing three medium-range missiles in quick succession, a further expression of muscle flexing. In spite of UN sponsored resolutions, an imposed arms embargo and financial sanctions, North Korea seems well on the way to nuclear weaponisation with adequate weapons in its arsenal and also the delivery means to carry the lethal cargo across most of the globe. Iran too has similarly cocked a snook. It pursued a legitimate nuclear program by building reactors for the generation of electricity, a rarity in the oil-rich Gulf. Its refusal to abandon its nuclear program (quite correctly) on the grounds that it could be used for subsequent weaponisation brought about another set of sanctions – which proved ineffective due to the refusal of China and Russia to come aboard. It was the recent revelation that Iran is building a nuclear enrichment plant hidden deep in the mountains on a military base near the holy city of Qom that highlighted suspicions that the plant could be used to produce enriched weapon-grade Uranium. Iran’s refusal to open the plant for IAEA inspections has heightened suspicion of its likely use; though Iran has stated that it will not enrich to more than five-percent purity; i.e. well below bomb – grade fuel. As tensions ratchet up, Iran reinforced its point by test-firing a Shabab III missile with a range of 2000 kilometers in a clear demonstration of intent. A frenetic series of Air Defense exercises followed as a signal to deter any pre-emptive air strike on their facilities. The stand-off between Iran and the IAEA continues with Iran flatly refusing to abandon its nuclear program, or open its facilities for inspection. In all likelihood Iran’s nuclear program is weapon oriented and even if it does not test a device it would soon develop the capability to produce and deliver a nuclear bomb at short notice. This will then raise the clamor in other Middle East states, especially Saudi Arabia and Iraq to produce their own bomb. The Fountain- head of Nuclear Proliferation While the world has been concerned about nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran, it has conveniently turned a blind eye to the epicenter of this proliferation for over a decade and a half. Since the mid-80s Pakistan has embarked on an extensive nuclear proliferation program; receiving nuclear materiel and know-how from China and exporting the same to Syria, Libya, North Korea and Iran. In those days Pakistan was an ally in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and its transgressions were overlooked by the USA and the West as such. It is only recently when the possibility of its proliferation network linking up with Islamic fundamentalists became a reality that the full extent of the Pakistan’s role in sponsoring world-wide proliferation was finally unraveled. There is no doubt that Pakistan is the world’s most flagrant nuclear proliferator. Pakistan’s nuclear program began soon after India detonated its first nuclear device in 1974 with Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto’s famous words “We will eat grass, but we will have the bomb”. Pak expatriate scientists were invited back home and under the stewardship of Dr A Q Khan given virtually unlimited powers to pursue an ambitious nuclear program. It gathered momentum in 1976 when Bhutto signed an agreement with China for nuclear collaboration and received 50 kilograms of weapon-grade enriched uranium, enough for two bombs. The Uranium cargo came with a blue print for a simple weapon that the Chinese had already tested. But the transactions were not entirely one-sided. In return Khan shared with his Chinese counterparts the know-how for European designed centrifuges (whose designs Khan had stolen) He even helped set up a Centrifuge plant in the Hanzhang province to aid its Uranium enrichment facilities. In return the Chinese provided 15 tons of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) which helped Pakistan activate its own centrifuges and further perpetuate the rampant proliferation. The results were brilliant or disastrous – depending on which way you look at it. Within just six years, Pakistan developed the Bomb while the US, now more concerned with Pakistan’s role against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, conveniently turned a blind eye. An emboldened Khan began exporting nuclear know-how, including bomb design to Iran, North Korea and Libya and helped them establish the base for the same nuclear programs that the West is so vehemently opposing now. Then came 9/11 and the position changed. Pakistan became a reluctant ally in the ‘War against Terror” and suddenly their loosely controlled nuclear arsenals and their links with terrorist networks became a matter of concern. As the extent of their links became clearer another worrisome aspect emerged; the likelihood of their nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands. As Pakistan wages war with itself, there is a distinct fear that is nuclear assets may fall into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. Three nuclear weapon related facilities – the Wah Ordnance Factories, the Kamra Air Base and the Sargodha weapon storage facility have already been attacked by suspected jihadis. Pakistani scientists have reportedly had discussions with Mullah Omar over radiological dispersal devices and two associates of AQ Khan were recently arrested for contacts with the Taliban and Al-Queda. There is an increasing fear that ‘Jihadis’ or even hard-liners within the army may divert a nuclear warhead to a fundamentalist group or a frustrated scientist with jihadi leanings may transfer know-how into their hands. If not an actual bomb, even if a radiological dispersal device falls into the wrong hands it can be used to cripple an entire city. Today one of the prime US goals is the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal; even if it cannot physically gain control of their weapons. The Bush Administration has spent over $100 million to help secure its nuclear materiel, warheads, laboratories and storage facilities many of which are located dangerously close to fundamentalist controlled areas. Control of the arsenal is another worry. The nukes are under the National Command Authority with the President as Chairman. However, Zardari has recently handed over Chairmanship of the NCA to the Prime Minister, a sign of his reducing clout and raising fears of the loose control of these weapons. Eventually the weapons would be under army control but how will the army ensure their safety is still anybody’s guess. To make matters worse the Pak arsenal is only increasing. According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Pakistan has produced approximately 2000 kgs of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and 90 kgs of weapon-grade Plutonium and built up an arsenal of around 90 warheads; a considerable increase from the 60 weapons estimated earlier. Concurrently the development of delivery systems has received a fillip with the nuclear capable Shaheen II medium range ballistic missile approaching operational deployment. Two nuclear capable cruise missiles the ground-launched BABUR and the air-launched RA-AD are also under development. This suggests that they have been successful in building smaller and lighter warheads. This growing arsenal is purely India-centric, notwithstanding the current turmoil within the nation. A growing arsenal and increasing instability provides a sure-fire recipe for proliferation towards the wrong hands. Reinforcing Non-Proliferation As the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea emerge and the dangerous likelihood of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands becomes apparent, the world again gears up to reinforce the Non-proliferation regime. During President Obama’s recent speech to the United Nations, he clearly enunciated the long-term US policy to strengthen non-proliferation, eventually ban all nuclear testing and halt production of weapon grade fissile materiel. This clearly indicates coming initiatives to strengthen the NPT, the CTBT and the FMCT and a corresponding pressure on India to sign on the dotted line. Yet though India need not be coerced into doing so, we can use it to our advantage. The five-yearly review of the NPT is coming up in May 2010 and it would be the ideal opportunity for India to get on board as a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). After all, with the signing of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, we have been accepted as a de facto nuclear power and recognized as such. The arbitrary premise of the NPT, that only nations who conducted tests before 1967 are legitimate nuclear states do not hold water. Extending the time-line upto 1975 will allow India to be accepted as a NWS, but will definitely draw flak from Pakistan, North Korea and even Iran who would then want the deadlines similarly extended. There will also be increased pressure to sign the CTBT. This decision needs to be evaluated in the light of recent pronouncements by our top scientists who have questioned the efficacy of these tests, especially the thermo-nuclear test. Do we have the requisite know-how to continue subsequent development of our nuclear program base on computer simulation; or do we need to conduct more sub-kiloton tests (which are permitted under the NPT). Yet we must realize that today’s world climate will not permit any further nuclear testing and such a test will simply derail the hard-won Indo-US nuclear deal. In the aftermath of the deal, India has already signed six agreements with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and fuel for our reactors is just flowing in. Further testing may not really be cost-effective and could actually unhinge our entire nuclear program. If India is accepted in the NPT as a NWS, it would be relatively easy to then sign both the CTBT and FMCT. But there is a case to strengthen the NPT itself. For one, the focus of the treaty should shift from non-proliferation to disarmament. Universal nuclear disarmament, once laughed off when proposed by Rajiv Gandhi, is gradually being talked about as a global policy issue once again. A gradual reduction of nuclear weapons with a complete elimination by 2025 or 2030 would be the eventual culmination of the non-proliferation movement. But this can only be achieved if USA, Russia and China themselves set the tone. Other aspects such as the incorporation of the “No-First –Use” clause by all NWS and also comprehensive guarantees by NWS that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS will be effective confidence building measures. Taken together both measures will go a long way in educing the relevance of nuclear weapons and paving the way for their eventual elimination. Just as the 1925 Chemical Weapons Convention banned chemical weapons from world arsenals, nuclear weapons too can be similarly eliminated. But just as the CWC could not prevent non-state-actors such as the Aum Shrinkyo cult from using chemical weapons, no treaty will be able to completely prevent the possibility of use of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. Yet, nuclear weapons are more difficult to obtain than chemical weapons and no nation, barring Pakistan is likely to provide access to non-state players. The challenge of nuclear non-proliferation lies in preventing the export of nuclear materiel and know-how not only to potentially unstable states such as Pakistan, Libya, N Korea and Myanmar; but also to organizations such as Al Queda, Taliban and fundamentalist groups operating in India, Chechnya, Europe and other parts of the world. The world is already paying a heavy price for Pak proliferation to Libya, N Korea and Iran. If we are unable to stop their proliferation to fundamentalist organizations the price we pay may be even higher. Ajay Singh Ajay Singh is writes extensively on contemporary warfare and geo-political equations